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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
vs. 
Respondent, / 
" Case No. 
I 10559 
MELVIN CANFIELD, \ 
I 
Appellant, i 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
The Appellant, Melvin Canfield, was arrested on 
the 14th day of May, 1965, for murdering Douglas 
Holland of Salt Lake City, Utah, on the 10th day of 
.Hay, 1965. The Appellant was arraigned before the 
Salt Lake City Court and charged with :Murder in the 
First Degree, together with two codef endants, Ted 
HillleLrande and Gordon Adamson. On the 28th day of 
J 
June, 1965, the deposition of Dr. James R. :Miller was 
taken in open court in the Salt Lake City Court, anrl 
the Preliminary Hearing for the Appellant and eo-
defendant, Gordon Adamson, commenced the 1st dar 1 
of July, 1965. During the Preliminary Hearing, a11ct 
upon motion of the Salt Lake County Attorney, the 
charges against Gordon Adamson were dismissed. The 
State presented ten witnesses. The defense presented 
no evidence. After arguments of counsel, the Appellant 
was bound over to stand trial in the Third Judicial 
District Court on the reduced charge of Murder in the 
Second Degree. 
On July 12, 1965, the Appellant was arraigned 
in the Third Judicial District Court, charged by Infor·. 
mation of the crime of l\'lurder in the Second Degree, in 
violation of Title 76, Chapter 30, Sections 1 and 3. 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. A plea of 
not guilty was entered. 
The trial was held and heard by jury with the 
Honorable Aldon J. Anderson, District Judge, presid· 
ing, on the 27th day of September, 1965. The jury 
rendered a verdict of guilty of Second Degree :Murder. 
The Defendant was sentenced the 7th day of October 
1965, to be imprisoned in the Utah State Prison for an ' 
indeterminate term. The commitment issued forthwith. 
The appeal of the Appellant is taken from the 
rulings of the Court. 
2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the 10th day of l\'Iay, 1965, at approximately 
9 o'clock p.m. the Appellant and three others drove to 
the office of the deceased, Douglas Holland, at 649 
South Fifth East, Salt Lake City, Utah (R260, 317, 
:J24, 392, 393) to collect payment for the clothes of 
Appellant that the deceased had maliciously ripped and 
destroyed the day before. (Exhibits 30, 31 and R398, 
317, 323, 418, 403.) Immediately upon their arrival the 
father of the deceased, Ben Holland, came out of the 
office onto the lawn, approached the car, and told the 
Appellant and the others in the car, "You guys better 
clear out of here or you're going to be in real trouble." 
(R262, 317, 395, 425.) Within seconds thereafter the 
deceased, Douglas Holland, came out of the off ice onto 
the porch, with a shotgun in hand, and without any 
warning shot at the Appellant. (R263, 270, 318, 325, 
B95, ·125.) The Appellant ducked down in the car to 
amid being shot (R394, 396, 398, 425) and raised up 
, to look and saw the deceased pump a new shell into the 
firing chamber of the shotgun and aim it at Appellant 
to shoot again. (R396, 426, 399.) Simultaneously, the 
Appellant saw a rifle being pushed up by Gordon 
Adamson from the back seat of the car. (R263, 270-
, 2il, 396, 426.) Appellant took the gun, put a shell in 
the chamber and fired at the legs of the deceased (R396, 
, +26-427, 436) to "either scare him or wound him to 
preYent him (the deceased) from shooting me." (R400, 
+27, 428.) The Appellant backed the car out of the 
:lrireway and drove away from the office of the deceased. 
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(R264, 397.) As he was driving away, the deceased 
fired a second shot at the Appellant. (R265, 326, 39i.) 
The victim died the next morning ( RIOI). 
Appellant contacted his attorney by phone and 
made arrangements to turn himself in to the police 
voluntarily (R410). The Appellant's attorney went to 
meet the Appellant but upon his arrival he found the 
police :were present and had placed the Appellant under 
arrest (R411). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT 
TO SUSTAIN A VERDICT OF MURDER IN 
THE SECOND DEGREE. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY OVER 
RULING APPELLANT'S OBJECTION A.NU 
ADJ\1ITTING HEARSAY EVIDENCE. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY OYER· · 
RULING APPELLANT'S OBJECTION A.rm 
REFUSING ADMITTANCE OF EVIDENCE 
OF THE DECEASED'S CHARACTER A~D 
4 
lU~PU'J'ATION FOR VIOLENCE IN SUP-
PORT OF SELF-DEFENSE. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY GIY-
lNG AN INSTRUCTION ON SECOND DE-
GREE MURDER. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT 
TO SUSTAIN A VERDICT OF MURDER IN 
THE SECOND DEGREE. 
The Appellant contends that the State failed to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt and present evidence 
~11ff icicnt to sustain the verdict of Murder in the Second 
Degree. Title 76, Chapter 30, subsection I, Utah Code 
Annotated, as amended, defines murder as follows: 
-~Iurder is the unlawful killing of a human being with 
malice aforethought.'' 
Title 76, Chapter 30, subsection 3, Utah Code An-
notated, 1953, as amended, defines the degrees of murder 
as follows: 
"Every murder perpetrated by poison, lying 
in wait or any other kind of willful, deliberate, 
malicious and premeditated killing; or commit-
ted in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpe-
5 
trate, any arson, rape, burglary or robbery; or 
perpetrated from a premeditated design 1111• 
lawfully and maliciously to effect the death of 
any human being other than the one who is 
killed; or perpetrated by any act greatly dau- 1 
gerous to th_e lives of others and evidencing a 
depraved mmd, regardless of human life ;-i~ 
murder in the first degree. Any other homicide 
committed under such circumstances as would 
have constituted murder at common law is rnur-
der in the second degree." (Emphasis added.) 1 
"Murder at common law is the killing of one 
human being by another with malice afore-
thought, either expressed or implied, i.e. with 
deliberate intent or formed design to do so." 
26 American Jurisprudence 161 Section 11 and 
cases cited thereunder. Section 12 of the same 
citation points out the common law distinction 
between murder and other grades of homicide. 
"Felonious homicide at common law is divided 
into murder and manslaughter. The element 
which distinguishes murder from manslaughter 
OJ marks the boundary between the two grades 
of homicide, i.e. is malice. Unless there is a kill-
ing with malice there can be no murder of any ~ 
degree. Lacking this element the offense is noth-
ing higher than manslaughter . . . " 
The trial court instructed the jury in Instruction 
No. 16 (R55) that six elements had to be proven beyond 
a reasonable doubt before the Appellant could be con· ' 
victed of murder in the second degree. The elements 
listed were: ( 1) that the Appellant killed Douglas 
Holland on May 10, 1965; (2) that the killing was with 
malice aforethought; ( 3) that the Appellant intended 
to kill Douglas Holland or that the Appellant intended 
6 
to do great bodily harm to Douglas Holland which 
resulted in death; ( 4) that the killing was unlawful; ( 5) 
that the killing was felonious; and ( 6) that said Douglas 
Holland died within one year. The Instruction further 
,tated, 
"If you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the State has proved each and all of the 
allegations of the Information as summarized 
above, then it is your duty to convict the defend-
ant of the crime of murder in the second degree. 
If, on the other hand, you believe from the evi-
dence that the State has not proved one or more 
of the said elements beyond a reasonable doubt 
then you should find the defendant not guilty of 
the crime of murder in the second degree." 
The Trial Court in Instruction 13a ( R5 I) 
instructed the jury: "The term 'malice afore-
thought' means pre-existing malice. 'Malice' 
means that condition of mind which prompts 
a person t9 do a wrongful act intentionally, 
without justification or excuse . . ." (Emphasis 
added). 
" 'Malice' may be express or implied. It is ex-
press where there is manifested a deliberate in-
tention unlawfully to take the life of or cause 
great bodily injury to a fellow creature. It is 
implied when no considerable provocation ap-
pears or when the circumstances attending the 
killing show an abandoned or malignant heart." 
Immediately upon the arrival of Appellant and 
three others at the office of the deceased, the father of 
the deceased came out on the lawn, approached the car 
:md advised the Appellant and others in the car, "You 
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guys better clear out of here or you're going to be in 
real trouble. (R262, 317, 395, 425.) Within second~ 
thereafter the deceased came out onto the porch and 
without warning fired a shotgun at the Appellant. 
(R263, 270, 318, 325, 395, 425.) The evidence shows 
that the shot hit the lawn but that it was in a direct line 
from the porch to the car in which the Appellant was 
sitting. (See Exhibits P-3 and P-21.) The Appellant 
saw the deceased pump the shotgun, putting a shell into 
the firing chamber, and swing the gun around, pointing 
it at the Appellant to shoot a second time. (R396, 399, 
426.) Gordon Adamson found a rifle in the back seat 
of the car ( R289) and handed it up to the Appellant. 
( R263, 270-271, 396, 426.) The Appellant took the 
rifle, seeing it for the first time (R403), and testified, ' 
"I fired at him to save my life to prevent him from 
shooting me . . . to scare him or to wound him to stop 
him from shooting me." (R400, 427, 428.) The Appel· 
lant backed out of the driveway from the off ice of the 
deceased. (R397) As the Appellant was driving away, 
the father of the deceased pointed the gun at the car 
and attempted to shoot the Appellant (R397); then 
handed the gun to the deceased who fired the shotgun a 
second time at the Appellant. (R265, 326, 397.) 
It is submitted that the evidence wholly fails to : 
support a finding that the State proved beyond a reason· 
able doubt three of the necessary six required elements · 
of second degree murder as set out in the Trial Court's 
Instruction No. 16 ( R55) . There is no evidence in tbr 
record from which "malice aforethought" could be con· 
8 
eluded. ".Malice" as defined by the Court's Instruction 
No. 13a in this case could not be "express" nor "im-
plied." ( R5 l) 
The only evidence in the record which in any way 
touches upon the Appellant's state of mind is the testi-
mony of the Appellant which completely negates a 
finding of malice. The very circumstances surrounding 
the shooting itself preclude a finding that the Appellant 
acted with malice aforethought or that he had malice as 
defined by the Trial Court. The Appellant, knowing 
the vicious nature of the deceased (R413, 415, 416) 
and knowing the deceased had threatened to "kill you 
(Appellant) if I ever see you again" (R436, 386) re-
turned the shot of the deceased only after the deceased 
had shot at him and "was pumping the gun and turning 
back around and facing the car again and pointing the 
gun at the car." (R399, 426, 396.) It should be remem-
bered that the deceased fired a second shot at the Appel-
lant. (R265, 326, 397.) 
Malice could not be express as defined by the 
Instruction of the Court because the Appellant under 
the circumstances of the shooting could not have formed 
''a deliberate intention." Malice could not be "implied" 
as defined by the Court because to be implied there must 
be "no considerable provocation." This Court defines 
and adopts a definition of provocation in the case of 
State v. Johnson, 112 Utah 130, 185 Pac. 2d 738 in 
11·hich this Court refers to a 'i\Tisconsin case Ryan v. 
State, 115 'i\Tisc. 488, 92 Northwest 271, wherein the 
l'Onrt said: 
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" .. : A learne~ text writer speaki~g upon 
the subject, says: In general, provocation con· 
sists in circumstances of such nature as are cal-
culated to produce and do produce, such excite-
ment and passion as might obscure the reason of 
an ordinary man and render him liable to do the 
act which causes the homicide ... The provo-
cation should be sudden and sufficiently great, 
-that is, calculated to exasperate both in its 
character and in respect to the person to whom 
it is directed . . . ' " 
It is urged that nothing could be more provocation than 
the deceased's shooting at the Appellant after threaten-
ing to kill the Appellant, especially where Appellant · 
was aware of the vicious nature of the deceased. (R413, 
415.) The instantaneous reaction of the Appellant when, 
without warning, he was shot at by the deceased (R318, ; 
325, 395, 425), and the Appellant's evidenced intention 
to save his own life (R400, 427), his reaction out of fear 
for his life (R428), and the threat of death from the 
deceased ( R4 l 7) , when combined eliminate the finding 
of malice or malice aforethought as required to find the 
Appellant guilty of murder in the second degree. 
This Court has held in the case of State v. Thomp-
son, no Utah 113, 170 Pac. 2d 153, referring to the 
case of State v. Russell, 106 Utah ll6, 145 Pac. 2d 
1003, and quoted, "Thus there can be no murder, either 
in the first or second degree, without a planned designed 
or thought out beforehand intention to kill or cause 
great bodily injury, or to do an act knowing that the 
natural and probable consequences thereof would be t(I 
10 
cause death or great bodily injury to some other person, 
11r to commit certain types of felonies. Anything less does 
not have malice aforethought." 
The only evidence at the trial from which to deter-
mine whether or not the defendant acted with malice 
is that of the Appellant. The Appellant testified why he 
went to the home of the deceased, " ... somebody sug-
gested that we go up there to see Doug (the deceased) 
and see if he wanted to pay for my (the Appellant's) 
clothes that he tore up" (R398). The Appellant further 
testified: 
Q. Now, when you were talking about collect-
ing from Doug Holland on these clothes, are 
these the clothes you are referring to? (display-
ing exhibits 30 and 31. R403). 
A. Yes. 
Q. 'Vhat did you intend to collect? 
A. Money. 
• • • 
When asked by the District Attorney on cross 
examination, the Appellant testified (R418) : 
Q. What did you go up to his (deceased) 
house for then? 
A. To ask him if he would pay for my clothes . 
• • • 
Q. 'Vhy did you get three to go with you? 
A. I was afraid of him. 
11 
As to the intention or the state of mind of the , 
Appellant at the time of the shooting, the only evidence 
again is that of the Appellant. He testified (R400): 
Q. I see. What did you feel the exact time he 
fired? 
A. I was scared. 
Q. Scared of what? 
A. Scared of losing my life. 
Q. And at the time that you had the gun and i 
you fired at him, what were you thinking? 
A. I was thinking maybe I could stop him 
from shooting at me again if I shot by him or 
wounded him. 
Q. I want you to listen carefully to this ques· 1 
tion. At the time you fired did you intend to 
kill Doug Holland? 
A. No, I did not. 
Q. What did you intend to do? 
A. To either scare him or wound him to pre· 1 
vent him from shooting me. 
The testimony is that the Appellant aimed low 
(R427), aimed at the deceased's legs (R426) and fur· 1 
ther testified on cross examination (R428) as follows: 
1 
Q. Isn't it true that you went up there tu 
fight him? 
A. No, it is not. 
Q. Now you knew you had hit him in the hip 
or leg, didn't you? 
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A. I thought I ha<l hit hirn in the leg. 
(~. \ Vha t made you t~ink that? 
A. Because I pointed the gun low. 
(-J,. Didn't you think if you just shot anothu· 
shot back that he wouldn't shoot bad.;: at ym~ ~ 
A. I didn't know what he would do. Like l 
sai<l, it· .was just instantaneous and that was the 
only thing that come into my mind to stop him 
from shooting me. 
(~. You knew this wasn't any self defense at 
that time, don't you? 
A. I was doing it to save my life is ·what I was 
doing it for. 
* * * 
Q. Of self defense? 
A. This is the way it's been all along. That's 
the only reason I fired a shot was to saye my life. 
This Court has been uniform in holding that a 
liomil'ide is justifiable if there exists in the mind of the 
~layer reasonable belief of the necessity of the killing. 
::-iee the cases of State v. Terrell, 55 Utah 314, 18G 
P 108, 25 ALR 497, and State v. Harris, 58 Utah 331, 
Hl!J P 145. See also 'Varren on Homicide, Vol. 3, 322 
and paragraph 314, page 588 and notes thereunder. 
In (Escussina the necessarv elements of self-defense b .J 
a~ .i11stif)'ing a homicide, this Court held in the concur-
1i11g opinion of State v. Law, lOG Utah 196, 147 P2d 
13 
* * * The element of self defense, or justi-
fiable homicide, is predicated upon two proposi· 
tions: (a) That the circumstances and surround-
ings were such that a man might reasonably be· 
lieve he was in imminent fear of death or great 
bodily injury. (b) That the actor did beliere e 
he was in imminent peril of death or great bodily ti . . . 
mJury. I 
• • • 1 
" * * * but under statutes such as ours, the f 
decisions have modified this rule, and it is now 
generally held that a homicide is justifiable if 
accused acted as a reasonable man with appar· 
ent good cause for shooting. (cases cited) ; the 
necessity for horr~cide need not be real but need 
be only reasonably apparent, that is, based upon 
reasonable grounds of belief that such is the 
case. (case cited) * * * " 
Sec. 76-30-10, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended, reads: 
"Homicide is also justifiable when committed 
by any person in the following cases: 
( l) When resisting any attempt to murder 
any person, or to commit a felony or to do some 
great bodily injury upon any person. 
( 3) When committed in the lawful defense 
of such person * * * when there is reasonable 
ground to apprehend a design to commit a felon~· 
or to do some great bodily injury and there is 
imminent danger of such design being accom· 
plished * * * " 
Sec. 76-30-12, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. ai 
amended, reads: 
14 
"''Then the homicide appears to be justifiable 
or excusable, the person charged must, upon his 
trial, be fully acquitted and discharged." 
It is submitted that the State failed to present 
cridence sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the Appellant was guilty of Murder in the Second 
Degree, and that the Appellant acted in self-defense. 
The trial court should have directed a verdict of J ush· 
fiable Homicide and acquitted the Appellant. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY OVER-
RULING APPELLANT'S OBJECTION AND 
ADMITTING HEARSAY EVIDENCE. 
The testimony which the trial court erred in admit-
ting was a purported telephone conversation received 
by the deceased several hours prior to the shooting, 
allegedly from one Gordie Adamson, not the Appellant 
(R253). The only testimony of the call was that of the 
father of the deceased, which was admitted over the 
objection of the Appellant. The father testified to parts 
of conversation overheard from the deceased, as follows: 
(By Mr. Banks) (R253-254). 
Q. So, now, at this time I want to ask you as 
nearly as you can recall just what your son said 
into the phone at that time. 
A. "No, but how about starting with you?" 
and then there was a pause and, "You are doing 
a lot of talking. Who am I talking to? Gordie, 
15 
Gordie who? Gordon Adamson." And tht 
there was some conversation I didn't get ai
11 
he didn't say anything. It ran for a little whil 
and then he said: "It doesn't make any differ 
ence who can lick who but one way or anotht: 
something has got to be done to stop this makill'· 
a hangout of my home." And then there was mt 
much said then for a little while and the11: 
"'Vipe me out, huh? Just where are you? 12J1; 
Pacific A venue, huh? How long are you goin1 
to be there? How about meeting you there i1 
thirty minutes?" And that was about all that I 
recall." 
The trial judge admitted the testimony under th( 
"state of mind" exception to the hearsay rule offered 
by the state supposedly to show the state of mind ul 
the deceased and not for the truth of the matter asserteu 
within the statement (R253). 
It is submitted that this testimony should not hare 
been admitted under the "state of mind" exception or 
any other exception because ( l) the alleged telephom 
call was not made by the Appellant, (2) the testimom 
is not trustworthy enough for the jury to consider, anJ 
( 3) any probative value it might have had was far out· 
weighed by the extremely prejudicial nature of the 
hearsay statements. 
Appellant's first contention is that the requiremeub 
for admissibility under the "state of mind" exception 
have not been met. It was encumbent upon the state It: 
lay a proper foundation showing the alleged phone call 
was relevant to the matters in issue. 26 Am. J ur . .tn1 
The state of mind of the deceased is in issue onl~· ~, 
16 
it relates to the Appellant. The authorities agree that 
111 the proper foundation for making threats by a third 
iii person relevant consists of proving, by independent 
er 
Jt: testimony, that ( 1) the accused had knowledge of the 
It 
H; threat at the time of the shooting, and ( 2) that the 
rn: particular person who made the threat was closely con-
~II : 
']1; 
h( 
ed 
ul 
eu 
or 
}\ 
1t· 
he 
Jli 
nected with the crime; otherwise, it is inadmissible. 
State v. Smith, 115 Wash. 405, 197 Pac. 770; Karnes 
v. Comm., 125 Va. 758, 99 S.E. 562, 4 ALR 1509, 40 
C.J.S. Sec. 238. 
Appellant submits that the record is wholly void 
of any proof that the accused was aware of the alleged 
phone call. The prosecution failed to lay any proper 
foundation before or after the admittance of the hear-
say in question to show the accused was aware of a 
threat or phone call to the deceased. The Appellant 
denies all knowledge of any phone call and this goes 
uncontradicted throughout the trial. ( R398-399) . 
The prosecution failed to establish any foundation 
that the particular person who made the call was closely 
connected with the crime charged. The trial court over-
looked the fact that there was no admissible proof what-
soever to establish who made the phone call. The identity 
of the caller rests solely on the basis of the double hear-
say evidence admitted. The state introduced no indepen-
dent testimony to prove Gordie Adamson made a tele-
phone call to the deceased. Gordie Adamson himself 
was not called by the state to testify. The only evidence 
tl1at Gordie Adamson was the name of the caller comes 
17 
from the admitted hearsay testimony. The declarant 
himself had no first-hand knowledge of who was on the 
other end of the phone. The deceased's declarations 
were based on hearsay because he had no personal know]. 
edge whatever as to the real identity of the caller. Tht 
trial court allowed this hearsay evidence to be the basi\ 
for further hearsay testimony of the father resulting 
in double hearsay. The state of mind exception may be 
valid to admit that which the declarant had first-hand 
knowledge over or evidences his own intention, Sine 
v. Harper, 222 P.2d 571, 118 Utah 415, but not 
that which is hearsay to the declarant himself. Had the 
trial court excluded the name of the alleged caller, as 
hearsay, then the record failed to prove who made the 
phone call. vVithout such proof, the foundational re· 
quirement of connecting the person who made the call 
with the accused wholly fails therefore none of the 
telephone testimony would be admissible. On the same 
principle it has been held that a threatening anonymous 
letter was inadmissible because it was not sufficiently 
connected with the accused. Karr v. State, 100 Ala. 
4, 14 So. 851. 
The Appellant further contends that the declara· 
tions which the father attributed to the deceased are 
too untrustworthy to qualify as credible evidence. People 
v. Hamilton, 55 Cal. 2d 881, 362 P.2d 473 (191311. 
In addition to the hearsay admissions there are other 
factors casting doubt upon the credibility of this testi· 
mony. The only testimony as to the contents of the call 
or to the fact that deceased received a phone call is the 
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dcccased's father. The prosecution made no attempt 
to corroborate even the fact that a call was made. Here 
the jury can only speculate as to the real import of the 
\\'ords and effect on the deceased. Part of the phone 
ronrersation testified to was "Wipe me out, huh" (R-
~j;j). The jury is left on their own to speculate as to 
what constitutes a "wipe out." Without some corrobora-
tion from an independent witness testifying as to what 
the deceased himself thought the caller meant, words 
such as "wipe me out, huh" are too speculative and the 
actual state of mind of the declarant is too undetermined 
leaving the jury entirely on their own to guess. 
Because of his relationship with the deceased, the 
father's competence as a witness should be examined 
carefully to determine the credibility and trustworthi-
ness of this testimony. The witness was unable to follow 
instructions and was admonished several times by the 
judge to not give his own opinion or repeat the words 
of the deceased. (R254, 256, 259-260, 261). The wit-
ness was obviously prejudiced and biased against the 
Appellant. The· father's testimony evidences a poor 
memory. (R267-268, 271-272, 273, 277, 280). Yet 
he testified with astounding accuracy as to the alleged 
exact utterances by his son and even includes names and 
addresses which prior to the phone call were foreign to 
him ( R2.53), even though heard under extreme circum-
stances. 
Appellant further contends that the hearsay evi-
rlenee was inadmissible because it was extremely pre-
jnflicial. It has been ruled in both state courts and the 
19 
C.S. Supre-me Cr_Jurt that adnittance r:d ex:remtiy !< 
11 
judicial he~,r-,ay is trrrJf whtn tLe probat:-:;-e ,-alut 
the tb tirnony is i'ar •-:iut\\-eig11ed by tLe prej ud:c:al na:~ ,, 
of the hearsay statements. Shepherd '· C. S .. :?80 r. c 
96 '193:3 : People '· HamJton, 55 Cal. :2d S~l. .:; u 
P.2d -±73 '19t31 : People'· P~s. 56 Cal. :?d !:1a. :}· ~ 
P.2d 713 ( 19611. c 
It is submitted. that the dariger wi~en Learsa: st2: t 
ments are admitted to show c1nly the dedarant's s:ate 
mind and the testimony is explosi•e ii na:ure is t[_ 2 
an untrained and inexperienced jury cannc•: p•:'";t, 
disentangle the state of mind from the rru:h or '.'. I 
accusations. The trial court admouished :te JlL1: l 
technical language that: 
• • 
·· ... the answer gi•en is not prorfered by :nt ~'a 
to proYe the truth oi the tacts contaiied ~:h:.n the sta:: 
ment that ,,-ill IlL•w be made but as e---:dence ·~·i thin: 
that "-ere said of the condition and state c•i r:rind c1I :_ 
deceased at the time when these sbtemen':s were nua' 
, R.:?53 . It is submitted th:1t no b,, mi:.d ~s CJPJ~ . , 
in the present case. The s:a:emen:s :::mc•Wl: :·~ r\m·e:_ 
accns~1tiL•ns by :1 man s:nce d~e:"?.sed and re?::::rdles' · 
the admL)niL.m fr(im tb-o tr::il c"-•ur:. ··H.__'w c.:::.r. :Ls jur 
:lYl•id the ·ren:Tbtr:1f11g cL~ng l•;:' :b.,se aQ':.:s.:::.::·:·D' r';l·: 
the ~r:n-e· ... Pe,,_-'!1le ,-. H:1:11J:~·~:. 55 C:.:.l. :2:1 SSL :3r. 
P.:2d -17~~ , H)tH . 
The _-\.ppell:mt st:t>m::s :L:.: :l-:_0 ~1d_:.:::::cci ,-_. 
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rnin<l. There is ample testimony in the record by the 
father from his personal observations that the deceased 
< was nenous, excited, and agitated after the telephone 
call. ( R25!J, 254). His subsequent actions sufficiently 
<lemoustrated the deceased's state of mind. The hear-
~ay statements in question added nothing to that which 
could not be sufficiently established by the father's 
first han<l observations. "Under such circumstances, 
where the true evidentiary bearing of the evidence is 
at best slight and remote, and yet the evidence is of 
a nature such as to make it very prejudicial to the 
party against whom it is offered, the evidence should 
be excluded." Estate of Anderson, 185 Cal. 700, 719, 
198 Pac. 407, 415. 
The Appellant submits that the court was errone-
ous in overruling Appellant's objection and admitting 
the hearsay evidence which resulted in great prejudice 
against the Appellant. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY OVER-
RCLING APPELLANT'S OBJECTION AND 
REFUSING ADMITTANCE OF EVIDENCE 
OF THE DECEASED'S CHARACTER AND 
REPCTATION FOR VIOLENCE IN SUP-
PORT OF SELF-DEFENSE. 
The Appellant made a proffer of proof to present 
tndcnce of several witnesses to testify about certain 
;11~tances demonstrating the violent and vicious nature 
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of the deceased. The Trial Court ruled that the evidenr 
was of the nature that would fall within an exceptio: 
of the hearsay rule but further ruled that the evidern, 
of the trial at that time was not sufficient to meet th 
foundational requirements for such evidence (R44f 
450). Appellant contends the Trial Court's ruling wa 
in error. 
The general rule with regard to evidence of 111· 
violent and vicious nature of the deceased is set out i1 
121 ALR 390 and the numerous cases listed then 
under: 
"'Vhere there is some evidence of self defem· 
the defendant was allowed to introduce evidem 
as to unlawful acts of violence by the decease1 
against the defendant and other persons, if prio 
to the homicide defendant knew of these act, 
either through his own observation or througl 
communication with others. 
"The majority of the jurisdictions held tha a 
this type of evidence bears on the questiuc 
whether the defendant was reasonably apprt 
hensive of danger of his life." J 
Jones v. State, 83 So. 2d 68, Alabama. 
~! 
"Evidence of the violent, turbulent, blooo 1, 
thirsty, dangerous character is received for th1 
purpose of illustrating or explaining the circuru ,. 
stances of the killing, or to give meaning to con 
duct of the deceased, * * * or to justify a resor 
to more prompt measure of self preservation. s 
n 
Demsey v. State, 266 SW2d 875, Court of Crin 
Appeals. 
b 
"In murder prosecution in which defendai 
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j(· 
o: 
claimed he acted in self defense defendant could 
properly testify as to any act of violence or con-
viction therefor by the deceased of which de-
fendant had knowledge at the time of the homi-
cide-and to any information or report of such 
act or conviction which had been communicated 
or made known to him before the killing; such 
evidence being admissible upon the question of 
defendant having a reasonable apprehension of 
death or serious bodily injury." 
State v. Finn, 243 SW2d 67. 
"\Vhere the evidence supports the defense of 
self defense, evidence of both communicated and 
i) uncommunicated threats made by the deceased 
are admissible. They are held admissible as ex-
plaining the conduct and apprehension of de-
0 fendant, the conduct and attitude of deceased, 
and as shedding light on who was the aggres-
sor." (Additional cases cited.) 
See also C.J.S. Homicide Sec. 222, p. ll38, et seq., 
a aml 26 Am. J ur. 389 et seq. 
Jc 
Inasmuch as the Trial Court ruled that the evi-
dence pro.ff ered could be admitted under an exception 
tu the hearsay rule, the evidence presented at the trial 
~houl<l be examined to determine if sufficient f ounda-
11 tional evidence was presented to allow testimony of the 
n ,·iolent and vicious nature of the deceased. 
To qualify under the exception, the evidence must 
show that the Appellant had knowledge of the violent 
nature of the deceased at the time of the homicide. 
At the time the trial court ruled (R450) the record 
had aLurnlant evidence of specific instances of the violent 
23 
and vicious nature of the deceased which were knol'. 
by the Appellant at the time of the homicide. The A 
pellant, the wife of the deceased, and a neighbor, Ardi 
vViley, all testified about the incident on April 22, 191i 
two weeks prior to the homicide, when the decea1, 
threatened to kill the Appellant. ( R346, 386, 387, 41 
417, 435, 460). The testimony of the Appellant abo 
that incident was: 
"Q. And would you tell the Court what to1 
place at that time? 
A. "\V ell, Doug walked in and walked out in 
the back room som~where, one of back room 
and came back into the living room with a han 
mer in his hand and told me to get out of J, 
house and stay out of his house and that if I 
ever seen me again he would kill me." ( R38t 
It should be noted that the police came to the hou· 
on this occasion ( R346) . 
It is clear from the evidence that the Appellm 
knew at the time of the homicide that the deceased h:1 
violently and viciously slashed up and destroyed ti 
clothes of the Appellant on May 9, 1965, the day pri1 .\ 
to the homicide. The wife of the deceased testified th~ th 
prior to the homicide she told the Appellant that H er 
deceased had ripped and destroyed his clothes (R3J: er 
368, 421.) of 
Further, testimony of the Appellant indicates Ii hr 
knowledge of several other instances which dernoL :i~ 
strated the violent nature of the deceased. (R405, H II! 
415, 416.) Appellant testifies: D 
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"Q. (.Mr. Lund) Did you have an opportunity 
to observe him around his wife and observe his 
nature? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. And when was this? 
A. In April. 
Q. Of '65? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you have an opportunity to observe 
on that day his nature toward his wife? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. And what was that? 
A. It was quite violent. 
Q. Did you know whether or not he had a 
reputation for being violent? 
A. That is all I have ever heard about the man 
is that he is extremely violent and constantly 
waving guns arou~d ~at people and threatening 
to kill them." 
The testimony of the wife of the deceased about the 
1 .\ppellant staying at her home several nights during 
the week prior to the homicide, because she was fright-
ened of the deceased, could logically result in the inf er-
ence that the Appellant was aware of the violent nature 
of the deceased toward his wife and that the Appellant 
1 had this knowledge prior to the homicide (R351, 352, 
L :153, 405). Further, the borrowing of the loaded rifle by 
!lie deceased's wife from the Appellant, "to frighten 
Doug if he came back again" (R351) "because I was 
25 
frightened * * * of Doug" (R353) could result in oni. ,rit 
one conclusion, that the Appellant knew of the viole1, hrc 
acts of the deceased which frightened the wife of tl (R 
deceased. ,:01 
It is urged that the only conclusion that can I stai 
reached from the evidence as set out in detail abm ml 
(R416) is that the Appellant had knowledge of U 1~P 
instances of the violent nature of the deceased prior! 
the homicide. The language of the Appellant's testimon suf 
is that he knew (R413, 415, 435) or had heard (R4I:1 eri1 
415) of other instances of the violence of the deceasea eri1 
The Appellant in fact referred to several instances n 
same (R415). 
From the evidence, the homicide took place on H 
llth of J\ilay, 1965 (RIOI) and the Appellant w: IN 
arrested on the 14th day of May (R77). During tl1 GI 
three days between the homicide and the arrest, tlr 
Appellant was hiding out (R428, 429). After the arres: L 
the Appellant was in jail or confined in the state prisrn y 
(R68, 69, 77). It is urged that the instances of th gn 
]JOJ 
violent nature of the deceased testified to by the Appe! 
llll] 
lant (ll415) by necessity had to be knowledge obtaint1 of 
prior to the homicide, because after that time he had Ii' 
opportunity ·whatever. It is submitted that in consider 
ing the evidence and the record as a whole, the only con· Ille 
clusion that can be reached is that the Appellant did li lac 
fact know of the violent nature of the deceased prio' th( 
to the homicide. 
The Appellant had subpoenaed and available n 'r·i 
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)11] ,ritHesses, five Salt Lake County Deputy Sheriffs and 
let, two Justices of the Peace of Salt Lake County, Utah 
tl (R18-31) to testify as to the particular instances in-
rnh,ing the violent nature of the deceased which in-
1 
1 
stauces ·were referred to by the Appellant (R415). The 
rnling of the Court prohibited their testimony on the 
)0\ 
U 1~ppellant's behalf. 
r ! It is submitted that the testimony on record was 
on sufficient foundational evidence to allow the proffered 
m eridence, and by denying the proffered proof of the 
sea eridence the Trial Court erred. 
in 
POINT IV 
H THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY GIV-
m ING AN INSTRUCTION ON SECOND DE-
tli GREE MURDER. 
tlr 
es: The Appellant contends that the Trial Court erred 
Ly giving the instruction on Murder in the Second De-
sot 
th gree because the elements of that charge were not sup-
ported by evidence during the trial. The burden of proof 
pe! 
imposed on the State to prove each element of the crime 
[ltl 
Ii' 
of Murder in the Second Degree wholly failed. 
!er The discussion and case citations set out in the argu-
011· lllent of Point I of this brief discusses in detail the total 
I li lack of proof on several of the elements necessary to find 
'io1 the Appellant guilty of lVIurder in the Second Degree. 
The weight of authority provides that in the ab-
;r·nce of evidence to prove any element of the crime 
27 
charged, the trial court should not give an instructii 
on that particular crime. See the annotations in 26 Ar ('1 
J ur. 546 et seq. 
In the case of .Mills v. Colorado, 362 Pac.2d l.i. 
the court allowed (cases cited) : State v. Carabaj:. 
26 New Mexico 348, 183 Pac. 406, 17 ALR 1091 
Arrejo v. People, 134 Colorado 344, 304 Pac. 2d 63 
"In order to avoid any misunderstanding, 11 
feel it necessary to point out generally it is in p< 
proper to instruct on a degree of homicide n re 
sustained by the evidence." (Further cases cited as 
s In the case of Tate v. People, 125 Colorado j2: 
24<7 Pac. 2d 665, the court remanded the case for rehear bt 
la ing on a verdict of _Murder in the Second Degree, citin. 
as error the Trial Court's giving an instruction on Mu: er 
der in the First Degree when the evidence did not sw A 
tain the charge. The court held: M 
St " * * * with equal force we have stated that n Ill 
Trial Court should not instruct on a degree 1 
homicide not sustained by the evidence. ( Ca1t 
cited.) * * * \Vhen this Court holds in a majorit 
of cases that a Trial Court should not instruct r 
a degree of homicide not sustained by the ei 
dence, then in this case, we must say that by sue m 
an instruction here, error obtains. The fact tlu oJ 
the Trial Court gave an instruction on Fir• T 
Degree Murder when the essential elements '.rer 
missing in the proof, it must be said that the .Jllf d. 
could easily infer by the giving of such an instrut r< 
tion that these elements were present in the CH'' 
It presents a fertile field for discussion arno1 
jurors not skilled in legal technique, for fimlll' 
a welcome opportunity to compose differe111' 
and agree upon a compromise verdict. * * * " 
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In Brooker v. State, 312 Pac. 2d 189, the Criminal 
11 Court of Appeals held: 
.J. 
)<, 
~! 
"If evidence in a prosecution for homicide fails 
to prove any element of murder, Trial Court 
should not give an instruction on Murder but 
confine the instructions to the degree of homicide 
which the evidence tends to establish." 
It is submitted that the argument of Point I clearly 
11 points out that the State failed to prove, beyond a 
JI reasonable doubt, the element of "malice aforethought," 
as charged, and further places severe doubt that the 
i: State proved it was either "felonious" or "unlawful" 
ar because the evidence clearly established that the Appel-
lant acted in self-defense. On this basis, it was clearly 
11. 
f error by the Trial Court and very prejudicial to the 
1
, Appellant to have the Court give an instruction on 
it 
Murder in the Second Degree where the evidence pre-
sented at the trial did not establish the necessary ele-
ments of that crime. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the evidence sub-
iC mitted at the trial was not sufficient to support a verdict 
w of Murder in the Second Degree, and, further, that the 
~r Trial Court erred by admitting hearsay evidence and 
r disallowing evidence of the deceased's character and 
11 reputation for violence. 
I, Respectfully submitted, 
FRANCIS C. LUND 
Attorney for Appellant 
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